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Abstract 
The Ford thesis argued that there was a short-term causal relationship between 
British overseas investment and British merchandise exports in the late nineteenth 
century. However, economic historians since Ford have found little empirical 
evidence in support of this argument. Using data on bilateral British lending, this 
article finds that such a relationship did exist, with British ex ante lending 
preceding merchandise exports by two years. A case study of New Zealand, which 
had an extraordinarily high share of Britain in its imports, reveals that the 
relationship was conditional upon the lending being allocated to social overhead 
capital. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the main contributions of the Ford thesis was to identify a causal relationship between 
British capital and merchandise exports during the late nineteenth century, whereby British ex 
ante lending to a given country preceded an increase in British merchandise exports to that 
country by a period of one or two years.
1
 Ford specifies two channels of causation. First, since 
the majority of British overseas lending was allocated to social overhead projects, these projects 
required capital goods, such as machinery and steel, which Britain exported in abundance.
2
 
Second, lending tended to increase the income of the borrowing country and thus raise its 
demand for manufactured consumption goods, which Britain also exported.  
 According to Ford, the causal relationship between British capital and merchandise 
exports functioned as an important equilibrating mechanism in the gold standard regime of the 
late nineteenth century.
3
 Increased demand for merchandise exports diminished the extent to 
which overseas lending was settled in Britain’s multilateral balance of payments through a 
transfer of specie, ceteris paribus. As the historical record indicates, the outflow of specie from 
Britain, even during peak periods such as the late 1860s, remained only a small component of the 
balance of payments.
 4
 Equilibrating mechanisms operated to prevent the acute outflow of specie 
from Britain, but was Ford’s proposed relationship between British capital and merchandise 
exports one of these mechanisms? Subsequent scholars have expressed their doubts. 
 For the purposes of this paper, it will prove convenient to conceptualise Ford’s argument 
as a lending-export loop, albeit an imperfect loop, since borrowed British capital was oftentimes 
diverted toward the purchase of imports from countries other than Britain. On this point, Brown 
argues that borrowing countries had, on average, low marginal propensities to import either 
capital or consumption goods from Britain.
5
 In other words, the diversion of capital from the 
lending-export loop was significant. In support of this assertion, he invokes Tinbergen’s finding 
that the marginal effect of British capital exports on British capital goods exports was just one-
                                                 
1
 Ford, British foreign lending, p. 305. Ex ante lending occurred when a creditor country 
committed to exporting capital, with the commitment usually taking the form of a primary security issue. 
The lending became ex post when the creditor country country actually exported merchandise, services, or 
specie. 
2
 Simon, Portfolio foreign investment, p. 25. Between 1865 and 1914, nearly 70% of British 
portfolio foreign lending was directed toward social overhead capital. 
3
 Ford, Gold standard, p. 59. 
4
 Imlah, Pax Britannica, pp. 72-4. 
5
 Brown, World economy, p. 52. 
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quarter during the period from 1880-1908.
6
 Nevertheless, Brown acknowledges that there was 
likely considerable variation among the bilateral marginal propensities to import from Britain. 
Brown identifies New Zealand as a colony with a ‘high’ marginal propensity to import 
from Britain.
7
 Because New Zealand relied on Britain for more than three-fifths of its imports 
during the late nineteenth century, the likelihood is that the marginal propensity of New Zealand 
to import from Britain was quite high, certainly higher than the cross-country average of one-
quarter.
8
 Even within the context of the British Empire, New Zealand stands out for its atypically 
strong bilateral trade with Britain.
9
 In 1890, New Zealand obtained 67 per cent of its imports 
from Britain, compared to other high-income colonies of the British Empire: Canada (38 per 
cent), New South Wales (38 per cent), and Victoria (42 per cent).
10
 The discrepancy between 
New Zealand and Canada was largely due to the latter importing manufactured goods from the 
neighbouring United States. As for the Australian colonies, inter-colonial trade amongst each 
other reduced the share of Britain within the country-compositions of imports, since the trade 
statistics of these colonies treat inter-colonial trade as external. Adjusting for this convention by 
treating all Australasian inter-colonial trade as internal, New Zealand still had the highest share 
of Britain in imports (82 per cent), followed by New South Wales (74 per cent) and Victoria (66 
per cent).
11
 
Several factors contributed to the exceedingly high share of Britain within the country-
composition of New Zealand’s imports. The comparatively small domestic market of New 
Zealand offered limited economies of scale for a manufacturing sector and, in this way, helped to 
ensure that the colony continued to import manufactured goods from the workshop of the 
world.
12
 Another explanation for the high share of Britain in imports is the high share of Britain 
                                                 
6
 See Tinbergen, Business Cycles, p. 41.  
7
 Brown, World economy, p. 52. 
8
 Official statistics of the colony (dominion) of New Zealand. Between 1870 and 1914, the total 
nominal value of New Zealand’s imports was £428.4 million, of which £263.4 million came from Britain. 
9
 On this point, Platt is even more emphatic, writing that ‘Britain’s competitive position in New 
Zealand was almost absurdly strong’ in Recent settlement, p. 112. 
10
 Statistical year-book of Canada for 1890, New South Wales statistical register for 1890, and 
Statistical register of the colony of Victoria for the year 1890. 
11
 Treating the trade between New Zealand and the six Australian colonies as internal is quite 
appropriate for the period prior to the Australian Federation (1901), which New Zealand nearly joined. 
The seven Australasian colonies were: New South Wales, New Zealand, Queensland, South Australia, 
Tasmania, Victoria, and Western Australia. 
12
 See, for example, Schedvin, Staples and regions, p. 544, which attributes the absence of a wool 
textile industry in New Zealand to the limited domestic market there, compared to in Britain. Partly for 
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in exports, and vice versa. Ships carrying manufactured goods to New Zealand returned to 
Britain with cargoes of primary goods, in a mutually reinforcing system that maintained the high 
share of Britain in New Zealand’s total trade. As for New Zealand’s leading export, wool 
enjoyed a growing demand from the textile mills of Yorkshire.
13
 In the 1880s, when the advent 
of refrigerated shipping made possible the export of meat and dairy, high-income Britain once 
again proved an eager customer. Further strengthening bilateral commerce was regular steamship 
service between London and New Zealand, which began in the 1870s.
14
 Moreover, as Hawke 
observes, merchant firms dealt in both imports and exports and, therefore, served as important 
‘institutional links’ between Britain and New Zealand.15     
Indeed, New Zealand presents an ideal case for ascertaining the presence of a causal 
relationship between British capital and merchandise exports, since the lending-export loop 
would have been little attenuated by demand for merchandise imports from countries other than 
Britain. In this respect, New Zealand surpasses even Argentina, which figures most prominently 
in Ford’s empirical test of his theory. However, the validity of the Ford thesis should not rest 
upon the case of New Zealand (or Argentina) alone. Accordingly, this paper follows a twofold 
approach for assessing the empirical validity of the Ford thesis. The first part involves estimating 
a regression for a panel of countries (colonies). In this endeavour, the paper benefits from 
Stone’s numerous series on bilateral British overseas lending that had been unavailable to those 
scholars critical of Ford’s argument. The second part involves a bilateral case study of New 
Zealand, which should allow for a more granular understanding of whether and how the lending-
export loop operated. Neither the first nor second parts of the approach should be regarded as 
superior to the other. A more representative sample inevitably entails the inclusion of countries 
with lower shares of Britain in the country-compositions of their imports. Finally, while this 
paper primarily aims to determine whether there existed a causal relationship between British 
capital and merchandise exports in the late nineteenth century, it also looks to gauge the 
magnitude of such a relationship, provided one existed.       
                                                                                                                                                             
this reason, Schedvin considers New Zealand as having become caught in a staple trap in the late 
nineteenth century. See also Watkins, Staple theory. 
13
 Between 1870 and 1913, British imports of wool increased by 204%, while imports of cotton 
increased by only 82%. Calculated from Annual statement of the trade of the United Kingdom. 
14
 Simkin, Dependent Economy, p. 154. 
15
 Hawke, The Making, p. 60. 
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 The findings of this paper should appeal to monetary and trade historians alike. For 
monetary historians, the absence of a Fordian lending-export loop would imply that other 
equilibrating mechanisms accommodated Britain’s overseas investment in the balance of 
payments.
16
 For trade historians, the absence of this loop would imply that British ex ante 
lending was not a proximate determinant of British merchandise exports. For instance, the post-
Baring falloff in British overseas lending in 1891 would not have resulted in any discernible 
decrease in British merchandise exports in 1892, assuming a one-year correspondence, or in 
1893, assuming a two-year correspondence.
17
  
This paper proceeds in the following manner. The next section discusses the Ford thesis 
in greater detail, as well as its subsequent treatment in the literature. This section also relates 
Ford’s argument to some more recent research on the effect of empire on capital and commodity 
flows. The article then proceeds to an empirical test of the Ford thesis, taking advantage of 
Stone’s data on bilateral British overseas lending. The following section offers a case study of 
British capital and merchandise exports to New Zealand. The final section offers some 
concluding remarks.  
  
LITERATURE 
Ford presented his argument for a causal relationship between late nineteenth-century British 
capital and merchandise exports in several articles published during the late 1950s and early 
1960s. The initial articulation of his argument in 1958 states that British ex ante lending, usually 
taking the form of a primary security issue in London, preceded an increase in British 
merchandise exports to the borrowing country.
18
 Social overhead projects in the borrowing 
country raised demand for British capital goods exports, whilst higher income arising from the 
social overhead projects raised demand for British consumption goods exports. The demand for 
capital goods exports can be regarded as the direct channel of the lending-export loop, whilst the 
demand for consumption goods exports can be regarded as the indirect channel.
19
 Although Ford 
                                                 
 
16
 One such equilibrating mechanism was the ‘rules of the game’. See Whale, Pre-war gold 
standard. 
17
 Between 1890 and 1891, British overseas lending contracted by just over half, as calculated 
from Simon, Portfolio foreign investment, p. 38. 
18
 Ford, British foreign lending, p. 305. 
19
 It should be noted that Ford does not use this exact terminology. 
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focuses on Argentina, he maintains that the relationship between lending and exports was 
‘typical of a large part of British investment overseas’.20 
 In a subsequent article, Ford considers whether the relationship between British capital 
and merchandise exports held in aggregate, and not just in the case of Argentina. Visually 
inspecting the deviations of aggregate ex ante lending and aggregate merchandise exports from 
their respective nine-year moving averages, Ford establishes that the inter-temporal relationship 
between lending and exports was either one or two years.
21
 Backed by only this crude evidence, 
Ford’s argument nevertheless persisted within the discipline of economic history for several 
decades.
22
 
 Hatton finds only the weakest possible empirical support for Ford’s argument. He 
constructs a demand function for total (i.e. not bilateral) British exports during the period from 
1870-1913 and includes an explanatory variable for British ex ante lending. In the initial 
specification of the regression, which includes explanatory variables for the main potential 
determinants of the demand for British exports, lending is the only explanatory variable without 
a statistically significant coefficient.
23
 When Hatton omits the explanatory variable for the 
growth of industrial production in advanced economies, only then does lending acquire a 
statistically significant, though very small coefficient.
24
 Although this finding casts doubt upon 
the existence of a causal relationship between British capital and merchandise exports at the 
aggregate level, there remains the possibility that such a relationship existed at the disaggregated 
(bilateral) level, especially for countries with strong financial and trade links to Britain, such as 
New Zealand.  
 Like Hatton, Eichengreen too assesses whether a Fordian lending-export loop operated, 
though with the broader objective of identifying equilibrating mechanisms during the classical 
gold standard, rather than identifying a determinant of British merchandise exports per se. 
Toward this end, Eichengreen estimates a battery of regressions, each with a different dependent 
variable. When the dependent variable is British merchandise exports, the joint significance of 
                                                 
20
 Ford, British foreign lending, p. 305. 
21
 Ford, British economic fluctuations, pp. 335-6. 
22
 See, for example, Kennedy, Foreign investment, p. 436, and Lewis, Growth and Fluctuations, 
p. 119. 
23
 Hatton, British exports, pp. 584-5. Hatton also tries leading British overseas lending by one and 
two years, but doing so does not alter his results.   
24
 Ibid. 
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the three variables for British overseas lending, led by one, two, and three years relative to the 
dependent variable, fails to indicate a causal relationship between lending and exports.
25
 Later in 
his analysis, Eichengreen finds that a positive shock to lending does not induce any substantial 
short-term increase in exports, but does raise exports above the steady-state level in the longer 
term.
26
 Differentiating between short-term and long-term causal relationships between British 
capital and merchandise exports is important. Certainly, British overseas investment in social 
overhead projects, such as railways, could have facilitated a long-term structural increase in 
British merchandise exports. However, it should be emphasised that the scope of Ford’s own 
argument does not extend beyond the short term.   
 Situating Ford’s argument within economic theory is a difficult task, partly because it 
pertains specifically to late nineteenth-century Britain, which was far-and-away the foremost 
supplier to the international markets for both credit and manufactured goods. The Fordian 
lending-export loop therefore attempts to characterise an economically exceptional country 
during the period when her exceptionality was most pronounced. Given Mundell’s finding that, 
in a 2x2x2 Heckscher-Ohlin model, the movement of factors and the movement of goods are 
usually substitutes for each other, Ford’s argument describes an unusual economic case.27 Yet, 
the nature of British overseas lending in the late nineteenth century helps to explain why British 
capital and merchandise exports were complements, rather than substitutes. The majority of 
British overseas lending took the form of social overhead capital: railways, tramways, bridges, 
ports, etc. In this respect, the movement of a factor (capital) did not directly induce the 
development of manufacturing in borrowing countries, but instead facilitated greater economic 
integration. British overseas investment funded the creation of a transportation infrastructure 
and, consequently, the geographic expansion of the market for British exports.  
 To a great extent, Ford’s argument is one about the British Empire, which absorbed 
nearly two-fifths of British capital exports during the half-century before the First World War.
28
 
To be sure, the vast sums that London channeled to the Empire were the response of a well-
                                                 
25
 Eichengreen, Alec Ford, p. 66. 
26
 Ibid., p. 68. 
27
 Mundell, International trade. He finds that factor immobility increases trade flows, due to 
commodity price equalisation, and that trade restrictiveness increases factor mobility, due to factor price 
equalisation.  
28
 Simon, Portfolio foreign investment, p. 24. This figure excludes Argentina, which is often 
treated as part of the informal Empire. 
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functioning capital market to the infrastructural needs of (more often than not) settler colonies. 
However, recent research suggests that the large share of lending to the Empire was partly 
attributable to the penchant that British investors exhibited for the Empire. Ferguson and 
Schularick estimate that membership in the British Empire conferred, on average, an 
approximately 100 basis-point reduction in the cost of capital borrowed in London, even after 
controlling for factors such as gold standard membership.
29
 This preference for the Empire was 
hardly irrational, however. The common British investor, facing information asymmetries, 
readily identified the Empire with British legal institutions and commercial policies, that is to 
say, the underpinnings of secure and profitable investment.
30
     
 As with capital exports, British merchandise exports also exhibited a distinct empire 
effect during this period. Mitchener and Weidenmier quantify this effect using a gravity model. 
They find that membership in the British Empire alone more than doubled intra-Empire bilateral 
trade.
31
 This finding was reinforced by Jacks, Meissner, and Novy, who estimate the 
determinants of bilateral trade costs, a standardised measure of the difference between actual and 
frictionless bilateral trade. When both trading partners were members of the British Empire, 
bilateral trade costs were halved, ceteris paribus.
32
 
 Long before it was quantified, the powerful effect of empire on trade had caused some 
scholars to regard Britain’s imperial markets as soft, which generally meant that British exporters 
did not have to compete against foreign exporters either to secure or maintain these markets. 
Thompson and Magee challenge the so-called ‘soft market’ thesis.33 According to them, three 
criteria must be satisfied in order for a market to be considered soft.
34
 First, per capita spending 
on British exports must increase over time. Second, the share of per capita income spent on 
British exports must increase over time. And third, the growth rate of per capita spending on 
British exports must meet or exceed the growth rate of per capita spending on the exports of 
other countries. Thompson and Magee, who focus their analysis on the dominions, find that 
                                                 
29
 Ferguson and Schularick, Empire effect, p. 297. 
30
 Ibid., p. 284. For a discussion of the information asymmetries that British investors confronted, 
see Thompson and Magee, Empire and Globalisation, pp. 180-98. 
31
 Mitchener and Weidenmier, Trade and empire, pp. 1813-4. 
32
 Jacks, Meissner, and Novy, Trade costs, p. 135. 
33
 Thompson and Magee, Soft touch. The authors acknowledge that previous scholars have not 
agreed upon a formal definition of a ‘soft market’, which remains a somewhat vague term, although tends 
to imply some lack of competition. 
34
 Ibid., p. 701. 
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neither Australasia nor Canada satisfy all three criteria, although Australasia had debatable soft-
market tendencies in the 1870s.
35
 The implication of this finding for the Ford thesis is that the 
marginal effect of British capital exports on British merchandise exports varied, not only across 
countries and colonies, but also across time, and it depended upon how successfully British firms 
competed in each particular imperial market.   
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The method for testing the empirical validity of the Ford thesis is a country (colony) panel 
regression for the period from 1870-1913. The main specification of the regression equation can 
be written as follows: 
𝑙𝑛 (
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑡
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑡−1
) = 𝐶 + 𝛼0 𝑙𝑛 (
𝐿𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡
𝐿𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡−1
) + 𝛼1 𝑙𝑛 (
𝐿𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡−1
𝐿𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡−2
) + 𝛼2 𝑙𝑛 (
𝐿𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡−2
𝐿𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡−3
) + 𝛽 𝑙𝑛 (
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1
) +
𝛾 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑇𝑜𝑇𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑇𝑡−1
) + 𝜀           (1) 
The dependent variable is real bilateral British merchandise exports. The explanatory variables 
of interest are real bilateral British ex ante lending led by one and two years relative to the 
dependent variable. This involves, for example, pairing merchandise exports in 1902 with 
lending in the years 1901 (one-year lead) and 1900 (two-year lead). Other explanatory variables 
are current-year lending, real GDP, and the terms of trade. The sources of data, including the 
deflators used, are noted in Appendix I. 
 The panel includes five countries: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Uruguay, and the 
United States, which are selected largely on account of their non-negligible borrowings from 
Britain and their adherence to the gold standard for uninterrupted intervals of sufficient length.
36
 
Because a currency revaluation would have affected the volume of bilateral British exports, the 
panel excludes those countries that either abandoned the gold standard or joined too late to 
exhibit enough inter-temporal variation, as did many of the Latin American countries.
37
 Since 
Uruguay and the United States joined the gold standard in 1876 and 1879, respectively, the panel 
is slightly unbalanced by the exclusion of annual observations for these countries prior to their 
joining the gold standard. Even though the panel includes only five countries, together these 
                                                 
35
 Ibid., pp. 703-5. 
36
 It should be noted that these phenomena are related; the creditworthiness of the borrowing 
country was enhanced by adherence to the gold standard. Bordo and Rockoff, Seal of approval.  
37
 Notably, the panel excludes Argentina, which had a chequered participation in the classical 
gold standard. 
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countries represent 43 per cent of British overseas lending during the period from 1880-1913.
38
 
Because Stone does not report any lending for New Zealand in 1870 and for Uruguay in 1877, 
1879, 1892-4, 1898, and 1903-4, £0.1 million is added to every observation in the sample, so as 
to permit a log-difference expression of the variable. All variables are expressed in log 
differences in order to make the series stationary.
39
 Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistics for 
all variables are reported in Appendix II. 
 Before proceeding to the results of the panel regression, some attention must be given to 
Stone’s annual series of bilateral British ex ante lending. Stone constructs these series using the 
data on London capital calls that Jenks and Simon assembled from more than forty sources, the 
Investor’s monthly manual chief among them.40 However, whereas Simon’s (published) series 
are disaggregated by continent, Stone’s series are disaggregated by country. Simply put, Stone’s 
series represent a reclassification of the original Jenks-Simon data. In a temporal sense, capital 
calls are consistent with Ford’s notion of ex ante lending, since both evidence a commitment to 
transfer capital, which precedes an ex post transfer of capital in the balance of payments, either 
through the export of merchandise, services, or specie.
41
 For the purposes of this paper, capital 
calls and ex ante lending are interchangeable terms. However, Stone’s series encompass just 
British portfolio foreign lending, whilst excluding foreign direct investment and other forms of 
lending conducted through the international banking system.
42
 Moreover, there is the problem of 
double-counting British overseas lending.
43
 Take the case of the Wellington and Manawatu 
Railway Co., incorporated in 1881 and capitalised—the former premier of New Zealand traveled 
to Britain to arrange the financing—at £850,000.44 In 1908, New Zealand nationalised the 
railway at a cost of £900,000 and borrowed the funds necessary for doing so.
45
 Whereas the first  
                                                 
38
 Calculated from Stone, Global Export. The shares of the countries were: Australia (9%), 
Canada (10%), New Zealand (2%), Uruguay (1%), and the United States (21%).  
39
 The log-difference expression of the variables prevents the inclusion of (time-invariant) 
distance. In other words, the empirical strategy cannot take the form of a gravity model. Most gravity 
models in economic history use time fixed effects, which is not a feasible approach here, given the small 
number of countries in the panel. 
40
 Simon, Portfolio foreign investment, p. 18. These sources are listed in Stone, Global Export, 
pp. 419-20.  
41
 For a discussion of what constitutes a capital call, see Stone, Global Export, p. 4. 
42
 Ibid., p. 423. 
 
43
 Stone mitigates this problem by excluding from his series those capital calls arising from debt 
consolidations. Ibid., p. 426. 
 
44
 Le Rossignol and Stewart, Railways in New Zealand, p. 663. 
 
45
 Ibid., pp. 664-5.  
10 
 
Table 1. Bilateral British merchandise exports, 1871-1913 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lending 
0.81 
(1.43) 
0.78 
(1.42) 
0.88 
(1.42) 
0.76 
(1.42) 
1.58 
(1.44) 
Lending, one-year lead 
0.16 
(1.46) 
0.12 
(1.44) 
 0.27 
(1.44) 
1.00 
(1.44) 
Lending, two-year lead  
2.73* 
(1.40) 
2.69* 
(1.38) 
 2.91** 
(1.38) 
3.29** 
(1.41) 
Cumulative lending 
  1.48 
(1.14) 
  
GDP 
57.74*** 
(18.30) 
58.07*** 
(18.13) 
58.34*** 
(18.19) 
55.08*** 
(18.03) 
 
Terms of trade 
21.75 
(16.96) 
22.21 
(16.76) 
23.10 
(16.80) 
 16.80 
(17.01) 
Constant 
0.81 
(1.33) 
0.80 
(1.32) 
0.73 
(1.32) 
1.09 
(1.30) 
2.93** 
(1.15) 
Country fixed effects
 
YES NO NO NO NO 
Overall R
2
 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.04 
Observations
 
200 200 200 200 202 
All variables are expressed in log differences. Standard errors are noted in parentheses. Coefficients 
and standard errors are rescaled by a factor of 100. * indicates statistical significance at 10%, ** at 
5%, and *** at 1%. 
 
instance of lending would be expected to raise the demand for British merchandise exports, the 
second instance would not. Without denying that Stone’s series present certain shortcomings 
with respect to the present exercise, these series are nevertheless used in the foregoing analysis, 
as they remain the only series of bilateral British ex ante lending.    
 The results of the panel regression are presented in Table 1. The first two specifications 
are identical, except for the use of country fixed effects in column 1 and random effects in 
column 2. Because the Hausman test indicates that there are no systematic differences in the 
coefficients, column 2 represents the preferred specification, and all further specifications 
employ random effects. The notable finding in column 2 is that lending (two-year lead) takes on 
a positive and statistically significant coefficient. It is also reassuring that GDP is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. In column 3, the variables for lending (one-year lead) and lending 
(two-year lead) are ‘cumulated’ in such a manner that the resulting variable is the log difference 
of lending between periods t – 3 and t – 1. If a Fordian lending-export loop operated with a one-
year lead on some occasions and with a two-year lead on other occasions, then the division of 
British ex ante lending between two separate explanatory variables could obfuscate the 
relationship between British capital and merchandise exports. However, such is not the case, as 
indicated by the statistically insignificant coefficient of the variable for cumulative lending.  
11 
 
Table 2. Correlation coefficients of bilateral British lending, 1880-1913 
 Australia Canada New Zealand Uruguay United States 
Australia -- -0.01 0.08 0.24 0.11 
Canada -0.01 -- 0.11 -0.19 -0.17 
New Zealand 0.08 0.11 -- 0.02 0.03 
Uruguay 0.24 -0.19 0.02 -- -0.02 
United States 0.11 -0.17 0.03 -0.02 -- 
All variables are expressed in log differences. No correlation coefficient is statistically significant at 
the 10% level. 
 
Columns 4 and 5 exclude GDP and the terms of trade, respectively. Excluding these explanatory 
variables increases the magnitude and statistical significance of lending (two-year lead). 
 In many respects, the model presented here is reminiscent of the model put forward by 
Hatton. Both are export demand functions for Britain during the period from 1870-1913. What 
then explains the stronger showing of British ex ante lending (two-year lead) in this model than 
in Hatton’s model? One potential explanation lies in what Edelstein describes as ‘short bursts’ in 
bilateral British lending.
46
 For New Zealand, this burst came in the 1870s. For Uruguay, it came 
in the late 1880s. Other countries realised their short bursts at different times. Such country-
specific episodes of British overseas lending are dampened in Hatton’s model, but are exploited 
in the panel regression here. To provide a sense of how much variation is lost through the 
aggregation of bilateral lending, Table 2 presents the correlation coefficients of bilateral British 
lending to all countries (colonies) included in the panel. None of the coefficients is statistically 
significant at any conventional level, reaffirming the desynchronised nature of bilateral lending. 
 The meaningful interpretation of the coefficient of lending (two-year lead) is made 
challenging by the log-difference expression of the variables. Because log differences can be 
treated as approximations of growth rates, the regression equation can be interpreted as a 
weighted average of growth rates, with the coefficients functioning as the weights. As such, 
column 2 implies that a one per cent increase in GDP would have been 22 times more of a 
determinant of bilateral British merchandise exports than would have been a one per cent 
increase in lending (two-year lead).  
Eschewing this more abstract interpretation in favour of a historically founded one, 
consider the Baring Crisis, which resulted in the decline of foreign capital calls from £116.6 
                                                 
46
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million in 1890 to £57.6 million in 1891.
47
 This 50.6 per cent decline in British ex ante lending 
would have caused British merchandise exports to decline by 1.4 per cent, or £3.1 million, 
between 1892 and 1893. To place this figure in context, the total value of Britain’s steam engine 
exports (to all countries) was £3.2 million in 1892.
48
 Though the marginal effect of British 
capital exports on British merchandise exports was small, it was hardly trivial.  
 
THE BILATERAL CASE OF NEW ZEALAND 
British lending to New Zealand 
New Zealand imported capital on a grand scale in the 1870s. Under the premiership of Julius 
Vogel, the colonial government undertook an ambitious program of infrastructure building, the 
centerpiece of which was the construction of a colonial railway system.
49
 Other infrastructural 
projects included roads, telegraph lines, and waterworks.
50
 Vogel’s program was financed 
through the issuance of debt, which was overwhelmingly purchased by British investors. 
Rosenberg estimates that, over the course of the decade, the nominal value of the external debt of 
the colonial government increased from £7.0 million to £25.4 million.
51
 Yet, it should be 
observed that the pace of borrowing was inconsistent, as there are clearly identifiable peaks in 
public capital calls for New Zealand in 1875 and 1878.
52
 
 A considerable portion of public borrowing in the 1870s was not allocated to social 
overhead projects, but instead to purchasing Maori lands and providing immigrants free passage 
to the colony. Collectively, the Immigration and Public Works Loan Acts of 1870, 1873, and 
1874 authorised the borrowing of £0.7 million for land acquisition and £1.5 million for assisted 
immigration. Whether borrowing for these purposes resulted in a short-term increase in British 
merchandise exports is a question this article addresses shortly. In the case of assisted 
immigration, British lending would more likely have raised demand for British shipping services 
than for merchandise exports.       
                                                 
47
 Stone, Global Export, p. 377. In real terms, the decline in lending was nearly identical at 
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The profusion of British capital that New Zealand borrowed during the 1870s was 
achieved through the centralisation of public finance at the colonial level. Through the 1860s, the 
provincial governments made recourse to the London capital market.
53
 However, as Attard 
describes, the provinces encountered increasing difficulty in attracting external capital, as both 
British investors and the London Stock Exchange doubted the creditworthiness of the 
provinces.
54
 The centralisation of public finance at the colonial level effectively occurred in 
1867, when the colonial government guaranteed and consolidated the provincial debts.
55
 In 1876, 
the provinces were abolished altogether. Attard argues that the strengthening of the colonial 
government of New Zealand can be explained by its ability to raise capital for economic 
development, whereas the provincial governments ultimately proved deficient in this endeavor.
56
 
Indeed, the central government of New Zealand was successful in attracting external 
capital during the 1870s. While public borrowing abated somewhat in the early 1880s, it resumed 
again in 1883 to finance another, fainter round of infrastructure building.
57
 By this point, the 
burgeoning public debt had become an acute fiscal concern, especially as New Zealand was amid 
a depression.
58
 In 1887, the newly elected Atkinson ministry adopted a policy of ending railway 
construction (and its finance) as swiftly as practicable.
59
         
The central government made a distinct return to borrowing in 1895. Some of the 
borrowing was undertaken to fund the Government Advances to Settlers Act of 1894—yet 
another instance of borrowing directed toward something other than a social overhead project. 
The act, intended to promote capital-intensive family farming, empowered the government to 
provide mortgages to small landowners for less than the market rate of interest. In 1895, the 
government issued £1.5 million worth of 3 per cent bonds in the London capital market, which 
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investors purchased at an average price of £94 8s 9d.
60
 This capital was then re-lent to current 
and prospective small landowners at an interest rate of 5 per cent, undercutting the prevailing 
interest rates of 6-8 per cent for private mortgages.
61
 Most of the original mortgages granted 
through this scheme represented the refinancing of pre-existing mortgages, rather than the 
financing of land purchases.
62
 The Government Advances to Settlers Act was liberal in its 
extension of credit, as it permitted the issuance of mortgages to both freeholders and, 
interestingly, leaseholders. Many of the latter held ‘leases-in-perpetuity’ from the state, a system 
of land tenure introduced under the Land Act of 1892.
63
 Throughout the early twentieth century, 
the popularity of the Advances to Settlers scheme continued to grow, and the colony (dominion 
after 1907) continued to borrow commensurately. By 1913, the nominal value of mortgages 
owned by the central government of New Zealand amounted to £7.7 million.
64
 
Insofar as the Government Advances to Settlers Act permitted landowners and 
leaseholders to refinance their pre-existing mortgages through the government, this act brought 
about a private-to-public debt conversion. Private mortgages were provided through New 
Zealand’s banks, which intermediated between depositors and borrowers, though the depositors 
were oftentimes Britons seeking to take advantage of more attractive rates.
65
 However, 
circumstances changed following the Baring Crisis of 1890 and the Australian Banking Crisis of 
1893, which caused British depositors to become fearful about the stability of overseas banks 
and to withdraw their deposits.
66
 Hawke argues that the objective of the Government Advances 
to Settlers Act was to prevent the flight of British capital, transmitted through the international 
banking system, from hampering the availability of mortgages and, by extension, the economic 
development of the colony.
67
  
New Zealand also imported private capital in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, and the corresponding private capital calls are included in Stone’s series. Some 
examples of private capital calls included the financing of the Wellington and Manawatu 
Railway Co. and the New Zealand Midland Railway Co. Still, the majority (64 per cent) of 
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capital calls for New Zealand were public.
68
 The large share of public capital calls for New 
Zealand is easily explained by the interventionist role that the central government played in 
building infrastructure.
69
 
 
Testing for the lending-export loop  
Given the diversity of purposes for which New Zealand borrowed capital from Britain, 
this paper now proceeds to test the applicability of the Ford thesis to the bilateral case of New 
Zealand. The regression equation from the previous section is estimated as a time-series for just 
New Zealand. All of the sources of data remain the same. The results are presented in Table 3. In 
column 1, the surprising finding is that the coefficients of the lending variables are all 
statistically insignificant. This finding challenges the applicability of the Ford thesis to the case 
of New Zealand, which was expected to provide the most patent evidence for the operation of a 
lending-export loop. The outcome of the time-series regression for New Zealand further 
contrasts with the outcome of the panel regression in that the coefficient of the terms of trade is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. 
The statistical significance and magnitude of the coefficient of the terms of trade are not 
entirely surprising. The lack of diversity in New Zealand’s exports—wool comprised 49 per cent 
in 1883—left the economy predisposed to fluctuations in the prices of a narrow range of 
commodities, specifically wool and, later on, meat and dairy.
70
 In general, New Zealand’s terms 
of trade improved until 1883 and then remained mostly stationary for the next three decades.
71
 
Still, there were occasional sharp movements in the terms of trade, and these movements often 
corresponded with movements in real British merchandise exports to the colony. The single 
largest percentage change in both the terms of trade (27 per cent) and real British merchandise 
exports (52 per cent) came in 1872. Following the Franco-Prussian War, industrial dislocation on 
the European Continent left Yorkshire in the position of satisfying a greater demand than usual, 
with British exports of woolens increasing from 293 million to 413 million linear yards per  
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Table 3. British merchandise exports to New Zealand, 1871-1913 
Dependent 
variable: 
Total merchandise exports (£) Iron exports (tonnes) 
Cotton textile exports 
(yards) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Lending 
-0.63 
(2.37) 
0.73 
(3.57) 
 2.98 
(7.31) 
 -0.32 
(4.47) 
 
Lending, one-
year lead 
-1.82 
(2.49) 
-0.37 
(3.47) 
 2.49 
(7.09) 
 -7.16 
(4.34) 
 
Lending, two-
year lead  
-0.21 
(2.33) 
-2.37 
(3.52) 
 -6.10 
(7.21) 
 -6.12 
(4.41) 
 
Railway capital 
formation 
  17.48** 
(7.86) 
 50.73*** 
(14.79) 
 -10.18 
(11.27) 
GDP 
80.34* 
(45.51) 
160.45** 
(69.29) 
134.13** 
(53.71) 
325.36** 
(141.83) 
260.32** 
(101.10) 
235.42** 
(86.71) 
169.87** 
(77.02) 
Terms of trade 
75.30*** 
(26.25) 
89.92** 
(32.51) 
83.71*** 
(28.26) 
139.51** 
(66.55) 
126.13** 
(53.19) 
66.51 
(40.69) 
60.51 
(40.52) 
Constant 
0.86 
(2.70) 
-3.15 
(3.95) 
-3.08 
(3.37) 
-9.80 
(8.09) 
-9.80 
(6.35) 
-2.73 
(4.95) 
-0.28 
(4.84) 
Interval
 1871-
1913 
1872-
1900 
1872-
1900 
1872-
1900 
1872-
1900 
1872-
1900 
1872-
1900 
DW statistic 1.77 1.71 2.08 1.70 2.08 2.06 2.19 
Adjusted R
2 
0.17 0.25 0.41 0.19 0.46 0.18 0.15 
All variables are expressed in log differences. Standard errors are noted in parentheses. Coefficients 
and standard errors are rescaled by a factor of 100. * indicates statistical significance at 10%, ** at 
5%, and *** at 1%. 
 
annum between 1870 and 1872.
72
 The elevated demand for woolens exerted backward pressure 
along the supply chain, with the consequence that the price of wool increased from 9¼d to 15d 
per pound.
73
 Yet, the strength of the relationship between New Zealand’s terms of trade and its 
merchandise imports from Britain cannot account for the absence of an observable lending-
export loop, since the terms of trade and British ex ante lending are not mutually exclusive 
determinants.  
Was the absence of an observable lending-export loop in the bilateral case of New 
Zealand due to the fact that not all borrowing was allocated to social overhead projects? Recall 
the difference between the direct and indirect channels of the Fordian lending-export loop. The 
direct channel involved an increase in demand for British capital goods exports, whereas the 
indirect channel involved an increase in the demand for British consumption goods exports. 
Lending for a social overhead project would have stimulated demand for capital goods exports 
via the direct channel and, by raising the income of the borrowing country, would have also 
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stimulated demand for consumption goods exports via the indirect channel. However, lending for 
some purpose other than a social overhead project, such as land reform, would have confined the 
operation of the lending-export loop to the indirect channel, presumably. Given the possibility 
that higher incomes were subject to consumption smoothing, a short-term causal relationship 
between British capital and merchandise exports via the indirect channel seems not especially 
likely.      
The objective now is to determine whether the bilateral case of New Zealand exhibited a 
causal relationship between British capital and merchandise exports through the direct channel, 
that is to say, when lending was allocated to social overhead projects. Unfortunately, Stone’s 
series on capital calls for New Zealand do not differentiate between social overhead lending and 
other lending. This article therefore employs Dowie’s annual estimates of real gross railway 
capital formation in New Zealand as a proxy for social overhead lending.
74
 The Dowie series for 
gross railway capital formation is preferable to the more recently produced Mulcare series, since 
the latter excludes private railway capital formation.
75
 This difference is particularly important in 
the 1880s and early 1890s, when most of the private railway capital formation occurred.  
There remains the question of the extent to which railway capital formation was actually 
financed through external borrowing in London, as opposed to through domestic borrowing. 
Private railway capital formation was effectively limited to the Wellington and Manawatu 
Railway Co. and the New Zealand Midland Railway Co., and these companies were financed by 
British investors.
76
 It is assumed that nearly all public railway capital formation was financed 
externally before 1900. The New Zealand official year-book for 1900 is the first volume in this 
annual series to decompose the public debt into the amounts raised in London and domestically. 
Of the £47.9 million of central government debt outstanding in 1900, £43.3 million (90 per cent) 
had been raised in London.
77
 However, after 1900, there was a marked decline in the dependence 
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of the New Zealand central government upon the London capital market.
78
 On this point, Simkin 
makes reference to the strained credit conditions that prevailed in the London capital market 
during the British economic downturn of 1900-4.
79
 Of the additional debt incurred by the central 
government from 1900-13, only 61 per cent was raised in London.
80
 The public finances of 
Edwardian New Zealand were becoming an increasingly domestic affair, and New Zealand 
broadly resembled Australia in this respect. Attard finds that the domestically owned share of the 
long-term debt of the six Australian colonies increased more than threefold from 1900-13.
81
 
Though, it should be observed that this increase was not due to a locational change in the 
placement of new debt, but instead to a net repatriation of outstanding debt. Of course, New 
Zealand may have realized a net repatriation of its outstanding debt, as well.      
 The growing reliance of the New Zealand central government on domestic sources of 
credit is perhaps best explained by the economic circumstances within New Zealand itself. The 
New Zealand official year-book for 1913 offers some insights: ‘This remarkable change in the 
relative positions of the State creditors may be partly ascribed to the ability of the mass wage-
earning population in the Dominion to save, and to the general appreciation of the manner in 
which their savings are invested’.82 Public capital formation through domestic savings was 
greatly facilitated by growth in real per capita income, which recommenced in the 1890s 
following two decades of stagnation.
83
 According to Greasley and Oxley, 70 per cent of the 
growth in real per capita income during New Zealand’s pastoral boom (1890-1914) was due to 
the rising rental value of cultivated land.
84
 To some extent, therefore, the refrigeration-driven 
pastoral boom was responsible for the increasing domestic share of public capital formation, 
which was most noticeable after 1900. 
In recognition of the apparent turn-of-the-century break in the externally financed share 
of New Zealand’s public capital formation, the proxy variable of gross railway capital formation 
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is not extended beyond the nineteenth century. Hence, the interval is truncated to 1872-1900 for 
the remaining specifications of the regression in Table 3.  
One further matter related to the proxy variable requires discussion, and that is the a 
priori inter-temporal relationship between railway capital formation and British merchandise 
exports, which would differ from Ford’s proposed inter-temporal relationship between British ex 
ante lending and British merchandise exports. The sequence of these three events (lending, 
exporting, and capital formation) would proceed generally as follows. British investors would 
lend ex ante to the New Zealand central government via a primary security issue, with the funds 
deposited into a bank account. Sometime thereafter, the government would draw upon this 
account to purchase British capital goods exports. Dowie estimates capital formation using the 
‘flow of funds’ method, whereby capital formation coincides with capital expenditure.85 Thus, 
the a priori inter-temporal relationship between British merchandise exports and railway capital 
formation is a contemporaneous one.        
Column 2 of Table 3 replicates the initial specification, but for the truncated interval of 
1872-1900. Once again, the coefficients of the lending variables are all statistically insignificant. 
Column 3 replaces the lending variables with current-year railway capital formation, the proxy 
for social overhead lending. The coefficient of railway capital formation is positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. In the case of British lending for social overhead projects, 
a Fordian lending-export loop emerges. Moreover, the coefficient of railway capital formation in 
Table 3 is many times greater than the coefficient of lending (two-year lead) in Table 1.  
A comparison of columns 2 and 3 suggests that the lending-export loop operated when 
British overseas lending was allocated to social overhead projects, but not otherwise. Social 
overhead lending likely stimulated demand for British merchandise exports via the direct 
channel. But is there empirical evidence for an indirect channel of the lending-export loop, 
whereby social overhead lending raised demand for British consumption goods exports in the 
short term? To answer this question, the direct and indirect channels are isolated by changing the 
dependent variable to capital goods exports and consumption goods exports, respectively. Iron is 
considered a representative capital good. Cotton textiles are considered a representative 
consumption good. Iron and cotton textiles are well-suited to this exercise because the Annual 
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statement of the trade of the United Kingdom reports the quantities of these commodities 
exported to New Zealand, thus obviating the need for deflators. 
Columns 4 and 5 replicate columns 2 and 3, but with a dependent variable of iron 
exports. The coefficient of railway capital formation is now statistically significant at the 1% 
level. This outcome suggests, even more clearly than before, that the direct channel was the 
modus operandi of the Fordian lending-export loop. In columns 6 and 7, with a dependent 
variable of cotton textile exports, the coefficient of railway capital formation is statistically 
insignificant. British ex ante lending to New Zealand, whether for all purposes or for just social 
overhead projects, did not cause any short-term increase in British consumption goods exports to 
the colony.     
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has revisited one of the main arguments of the Ford thesis: a causal relationship 
between British capital and merchandise exports during the late nineteenth century. The 
availability of annual data on bilateral British ex ante lending permitted the estimation of a 
country panel regression, which proved more conclusive than the econometric tests employed by 
Hatton and Eichengreen. The coefficient of British ex ante lending (two-year lead) was 
statistically significant at either the 10% or 5% level, depending upon the specification of the 
regression. The magnitude of this coefficient was small, but far from negligible. Indeed, it was 
estimated that the Baring Crisis, which precipitated a sharp decline in British overseas lending, 
curtailed British merchandise exports by several million pounds.  
For monetary historians, the magnitude of the coefficient implies that the lending-export 
loop only minimally offset overseas lending in Britain’s multilateral balance of payments. In this 
sense, Ford’s argument does little to advance an understanding of how the classical gold standard 
worked, at least in the short term. As Eichengreen argues, there was likely a long-term causal 
relationship between British capital and merchandise exports. Certainly, the role that British 
capital exports played in the geographic expansion of the market for British exports is a subject 
ripe for future consideration. The specific focus of this article, though, has been on Ford’s 
argument, which was concerned with just the short term.  
 The high share of Britain in the country-composition of New Zealand’s imports rendered 
this bilateral case especially appropriate for better understanding the operation of the lending-
21 
 
export loop. Surprisingly, there was no initial evidence for the operation of a lending-export loop 
in New Zealand. However, when only British ex ante lending for social overhead projects was 
considered, there emerged an obvious lending-export loop. Furthermore, by distinguishing 
between capital goods exports and consumption goods exports, it became clear that the operation 
of the Fordian lending-export loop was due to the direct channel. In this sense, the Ford thesis 
has been qualified.  
 At the risk of concluding on a speculative note, perhaps the most significant implications 
of this article are for imperial history. The existence of a causal relationship between British 
capital and merchandise exports may well alter the debate over the so-called balance sheet of 
empire.
86
 Yes, the British Empire introduced a capital-market distortion—a liability—in favour 
of imperial borrowers. But any detrimental effect of this distortion, such as reducing otherwise 
profitable domestic investment (to say nothing of non-imperial overseas investment), was partly 
offset by a short-term increase in demand for British exports, provided the lending was directed 
toward social overhead capital. At the non-imperial cost of capital, would New Zealand have 
borrowed so liberally to finance railway construction in the 1870s? The same question can just as 
well be asked of Canada for the first decade of the twentieth century.
87
 Britain lent more to its 
Empire and, consequently, exported more to its Empire, as well. In such a way, the lending-
export loop supplements the more direct effects of empire on commodity trade.  
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APPENDIX I 
British exports 
For all countries, these figures are obtained from Annual statement of the trade of the United 
Kingdom and deflated by the British export price index from Imlah, Pax Britannica, pp. 96-8. 
For consistency, figures for Canada include Newfoundland and Labrador. 
British lending 
For all countries, these figures are obtained from Stone, Global Export and deflated by the 
British export price index from Imlah, Pax Britannica, pp. 96-8. 
Real GDP 
Australia: Butlin, Australian Domestic Product, pp. 33-4. 
Canada: Urquhart, Derivation of the Estimates, pp. 24-5. 
New Zealand: Calculated as the real GDP per capita reported in Greasley and Oxley, 
Cointegration based approach, pp. 365-6, multiplied by the non-Maori population of New 
Zealand reported in Rankin, Gross national product, pp. 58-9. 
Uruguay: Maddison, World Economy, p. 132. 
United States: Sutch and Carter, Historical Statistics of the United States, table Ca9.  
Terms of trade 
Australia: Wilson, Capital Imports, p. 89.  
Canada: Calculated from Urquhart and Buckley, Historical Statistics of Canada, p. 184. This 
series pertains to fiscal years ending 31 March (until 1908) and ending 30 June (thereafter). 
Therefore, the terms of trade lag British exports by either one-quarter or one-half years. 
New Zealand: Calculated from Easton and Wilson, N. Z.’s terms, pp. 36-7. The author thanks 
Brian Easton for supplying this data. 
Uruguay: Baptista and Bértola, 1999, unpublished data. The author thanks Belén Baptista for 
supplying this data.  
United States: Lipsey, Quantity Trends, p. 442. This series pertains to fiscal years ending 30 
June. Therefore, the terms of trade lead British exports by one-half year. 
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APPENDIX II 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistics 
 Interval I(0) I(1) 
Australia    
Exports 1871-1913 -2.50 -5.85*** 
Lending 1871-1913 -2.75* -7.30*** 
GDP 1871-1913 -1.78 -8.80*** 
Terms of trade 1871-1913 -2.55 -9.56*** 
Canada    
Exports 1871-1913 0.04 -7.49*** 
Lending 1871-1913 -2.56 -10.10*** 
GDP 1871-1913 1.60 -6.46*** 
Terms of trade 1871-1913 -2.53 -6.85*** 
New Zealand    
Exports 1871-1913 -2.65* -5.75*** 
Lending 1871-1913 -4.04*** -9.11*** 
GDP 1871-1913 -2.27 -6.10*** 
Terms of trade 1871-1913 -3.65*** -7.51*** 
Railway capital formation 1872-1900 -3.19** -3.82*** 
Iron 1872-1900 -3.41** -5.11*** 
Cotton textiles 1872-1900 -1.29 -5.77*** 
Uruguay    
Exports 1877-1913 -2.18 -8.01*** 
Lending 1877-1913 -3.65** -6.57*** 
GDP 1877-1913 -0.59 -8.12*** 
Terms of trade 1877-1913 -1.91 -6.13*** 
United States    
Exports 1880-1913 -3.47** -8.99*** 
Lending 1880-1913 -3.09** -7.57*** 
GDP 1880-1913 -0.35 -8.67*** 
Terms of trade 1880-1913 -2.55 -5.61*** 
All variables are expressed in natural logarithms. * indicates statistical significance at 10%, ** at 
5%, and *** at 1%. 
 
 
